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Abstract—Many of today’s crypto currencies use blockchains
as decentralized ledgers and secure them with proof of work. In
case of a fork of the chain, Bitcoin’s rule for achieving consensus
is selecting the longest chain and discarding the other chain as
stale. It has been demonstrated that this consensus rule has a
weakness against selfish mining in which the selfish miner exploits
the variance in block generation by partially withholding blocks.
In Ethereum, however, under certain conditions stale blocks don’t
have to be discarded but can be referenced from the main chain
as uncle blocks yielding a partial reward. This concept limits the
impact of network delays on the expected revenue for miners.
But the concept also reduces the risk for a selfish miner to gain
no rewards from withholding a freshly minted block.
This paper uses a Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the
effect of uncle blocks both to the profitability of selfish mining
and the blockchain’s security in Ethereum (ETH). A brief outlook
about a recent Ethereum Classic (ETC) improvement proposal
that weighs uncle blocks during the selection of the main chain
will be given.
Index Terms—Blockchain, GHOST, Ethereum, Uncle Blocks,
Selfish Mining
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the release of Bitcoin in 2009 [1], many blockchain-
based crypto currencies have followed. Currently, Ethereum
is one of the most successful. It claims to be a “Secure
Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger” [2]. It differs
from Bitcoin in that it offers a more flexible way of handling
contracts, has a higher block generation rate and different
mining rewards. Ethereum relies on a proof of work secured
blockchain1. Because there is money involved, miners that
perform proof of work may try to devise strategies to increase
their mining revenue beyond their fair share. In the literature,
such a technique has been described as selfish mining. This
strategy is exploiting the variance in block generation by
partially withholding information [3], causing altruistic miners
to waste computational resources. For a selfish miner in Bit-
coin, withholding a freshly minted block from the blockchain
involves a risk: by the time the selfish miner releases the
block, the other miners may have advanced in the chain and
this block becomes stale, thus not yielding any reward for
the selfish miner. Normally, stale blocks come into existence
1At the time of writing, there are proposals to migrate from proof of work
to proof of stake.
due to propagation delays. Block generation rate and informa-
tion propagation in the underlying peer-to-peer-networks have
already been analyzed in depth, e.g. by Decker and Watten-
hofer [4]. Based on that, Gervais et al. [5] quantified trade-offs
between network throughput and blockchain security. Since
optimized values for block size and block generation rate alone
could not solve the transaction throughput limits of the existing
consensus rules, more advanced variants were developed. A
well-known example is the GHOST-rule [6] [7] which utilizes
stale blocks in the calculation of the heaviest chain which
is considered to be the main chain. To counter the negative
impact of propagation delays on mining rewards in Ethereum,
stale blocks may be included in the main chain as uncle blocks.
Altering GHOST, these uncle blocks yield a partial reward for
all involved parties. Until Ethereum’s Byzantinum hard fork
in October 2017 [8], this could be exploited by a technique
called uncle mining [9]. Even after this hard fork, uncle
block rewards still influence the profitability of the original
selfish mining strategy [3]. So far, there hasn’t been a study
to quantify this effect as well as the blockchain’s remaining
resilience to further attacks.
This paper shows that partially rewarding uncle blocks as
done in Ethereum lowers the threshold at which selfish mining
becomes profitable from 0.25 if there are no uncle block
rewards to approximately 0.185±0.012 at an honest network’s
uncle block ratio as observed in December 2017. Furthermore,
it also quantifies how the presence of a selfish miner weakens
Ethereum against further attackers.
II. BACKGROUND
As stated previously, Ethereum builds upon a public ledger
to record all state changes in a sequence of blocks called
blockchain. Pending state changes are broadcast via messages
between all nodes of a Kademlia based peer-to-peer-network
and are eventually processed into a block’s payload by spe-
cialized miner nodes. If a miner node succeeds to solve a
cryptographic-puzzle by finding a low hash value (performing
proof-of-work), the solution is propagated throughout the
network. The miner receives a block reward paid in Ether
(ETH) for doing so. The blockchain’s height increases by one
as the new block is replicated across all nodes. The details of
the Ethereum system are documented in a regularly updated
whitepaper [10] as well as a yellowpaper [2].
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In contrast to other crypto currencies, Ethereum features a
comparably small average time between block generations –
approximately 15 seconds [11] at the time of the writing. If
more than one block of the same blockchain height is prop-
agated throughout the network simultaneously, these blocks
form a fork. Employing what is called random tie breaking,
miners randomly choose upon which fork they try to build
their next block. Over time, one of the forked chains will grow
longer than the other. Following the consensus protocol, all
nodes will recognize the longest chain as the main chain [12]
and continue to extend this one. Therefore the smaller average
block time of Ethereum results in a significantly higher rate
of blocks not increasing the blockchain height: in 2017 it
varied between 0.06 and 0.24 and reached its peak in Januar
2018 [13]. This peak was caused by a global hype of crypto
currencies resulting in a high number of transactions [14]
within the Ethereum network. Therefore bigger blocks [15]
were created which take longer both to propagate within the
network and to be validated by the nodes.
In general, every block that is not part of the main chain is
called a stale block. Stale blocks do not yield a reward and
their payload is ignored. In Ethereum, every stale block that
is a direct descendant of a main chain (regular) block may
be referenced as an uncle or ommer block from one of the
following regular blocks (nephew) up to a maximum distance
of 6 blocks after the fork (see Fig. 1 with description below).
Therefore uncle blocks contain a valid header. Nevertheless
their payload is ignored. Up to two uncle blocks may be
referenced by one regular block. The miner of the referencing
block gets an inclusion reward of 132 block reward. The uncle
block miner’s reward depends on how many blocks later the
uncle block was referenced: the reward ranges from a 78 block
reward for an immediate inclusion to a 28 block reward for
inclusion 6 blocks later. In November 2017, an average uncle
block reward of 0.725 was observed [13] [16]. Thus an uncle
block is included by a nephew block on average two blocks
later. In case of forks longer than one block, any further
descendants may not be referenced as uncle blocks.
b5b4ab3a
b4bb3b
b2a
b2bb1
Fig. 1. Ethereum blockchain sample. Block b2a is a first generation uncle
block due to the inclusion by block b3a with distance one. Block b3b is a
second generation uncle block. Block b4b is a stale block and may not be
referenced as an uncle block since it’s parent, block b3b, is not part of the
main chain.
The Ethereum network tries to maintain a constant average
block time. This is achieved by a dynamic adjustment of
the proof-of-work difficulty according to the actual block
generation rate. Formerly, only regular blocks were used to
determine the network’s block generation rate. This made an
exploit called uncle mining [9] possible. Since the Byzantinum
hard fork in October 2017 [8], uncle blocks are also counted
within the calculation of the block generation rate.
III. MODEL
A. Quantities of interest
In selfish mining, a mining party within the network is trying
to receive a share of the revenue larger than its share of mining
power. Following the model of Eyal and Sirer [3], the selfish
miner will not necessarily comply with the Ethereum protocol.
It is assumed that his connection to the network is perfect.
Therefore, he is capable of instantly receiving information
about events such as block creations, and may react in time.
His fraction of the total network’s mining power is defined
as α. All other, honest participants are assumed to follow the
Ethereum protocol as intended. Their fraction of mining power
is defined as β. In the absence of a further attacker, α+β = 1.
In case of ties, i.e. chains of same length, Ethereum uses
random tie breaking in which miners are expected to randomly
select on which block to continue mining if they notice a fork.
Therefore the honest network’s mining power will be diverted
with a fraction of γ ·β mining on any of the competing chains.
This deviates from the original selfish mining [3] as the selfish
miner is not capable of influencing γ without further attacking
the honest network, e.g. with eclipse attacks [17], which is
outside this paper’s scope. This results in:
γ =
1
number of competing chains
(1)
Extending selfish mining as proposed in [3], the ratio of the
honest network’s stale block generation to honest networks
overall block generation is given by δ, with δ ≤ β. The selfish
miner is assumed to be perfectly connected, therefore will
never create stale blocks within his secret fork and build a
linear chain.
As in Eyal and Sirers’ model [3], the selfish miner aims
to increase his revenue in relation to the honest network’s
revenue, which is defined as the relative revenue ratio (RRR).
Both uncle blocks and regular blocks are counted within
the difficulty calculation. Thus the sum of uncle block rate
and regular block rate is constant. As stated previously,
in Ethereum uncle blocks yield lower rewards than regular
blocks. Therefore the uncle block ratio is assumed to influence
the profitability of selfish mining as it causes a high uncle
block ratio which lowers the overall reward. It can be assumed
a selfish miner prefers maximizing his absolute revenue, which
is reflected by the absolute revenue ratio (ARR). Let
• nb(p, r) the number of a party’s regular blocks,
• nb(p, u) the number of a party’s uncle blocks,
• nb(a, r) the number of all regular blocks,
• nb(a, u) the number of all uncle blocks and
• rev(p) the party’s normalized total revenue from all
blocks with the reward of a regular block set to 1.
ARR may then be defined as follows:
ARR =
nb(p, r) + nb(p, u)
nb(a, r) + nb(a, u)
· rev(p)
nb(p, r) + nb(p, u)
(2)
The left fraction reflects the ratio of a party’s blocks that yield
any reward in relation to all blocks yielding any reward. The
right fraction reflects the party’s average reward per block. The
equation can be further simplified:
ARR =
rev(p)
nb(a, r) + nb(a, u)
(3)
While absolute and relative revenue ratio measure prof-
itability of selfish mining as such, selfish mining might also
affect the resilience of the network against attacks that rely
on (partial) control of the blockchain, e.g. double spending or
a 0.5 +  (colloquial 51%) attack. Two scenarios need to be
distinguished:
• The selfish miner could attack the network. Even if he
does not earn money from the attack directly, he might
be bribed by others to do so. The effectiveness of the
attack primarily depends of the ratio of the selfish miner’s
regular blocks that extend the blockchain’s height in
comparison to all other blocks within the main chain –
referred to as the regular block ratio (RBR).
• Not the selfish miner, but another party could attack the
network. As mentioned before, stale blocks do not extend
the longest chain. Thus every stale block lowers the
overall resilience of the blockchain against such attacks
compared to a best case linear blockchain with the given
mining resources. This is reflected by the relative network
security (RNS ) which is defined as the number of regular
blocks in relation to all blocks (including stale blocks and
uncle blocks).
RNS also outlines the network’s liveliness: Since all stale
blocks’ payload is ignored and the stale blocks’ counterparts at
same height within the main chain do not necessarily contain
the same payload, the missing payload needs to be added to the
blockchain again within one of the following regular blocks.
While the blockchain is under load, i.e. each block’s payload
is fully utilized, uncle blocks may have a significant impact
on the network transaction throughput since uncle blocks are
counted as regular blocks within the block generation rate [8].
B. Simulator
To quantify the aforementioned values of interest, attempts
were made to define an MDP extending Eyal and Sirers’
previous work [3]. But random tie breaking and uncle block in-
clusion could not be expressed in closed form without various
assumptions sacrificing accuracy. Consequently, a Monte Carlo
Simulation was designed instead. It runs a defined number
of steps within a discrete system modeling block generation
events. The underlying data structure captures all relevant
aspects of a blockchain and is evaluated after all blocks have
been created. In each simulation step, a new block is mined –
by either the selfish miner (α) or the honest network (βr, βs)
according to the following rules:
α The selfish miner mines a new block on top of the best
block known to him. If he already maintains a secret fork,
the best block is always the top of that, otherwise the best
block is the top of the longest public chain. In case of
competing chains, one is chosen randomly. One way or
the other, the block is kept secret for the moment. Only
in case of competing chains with one having been mined
by the selfish miner himself earlier, that one is selected
in particular instead of a random choice. And only in
that case, the block is published immediately. This event
occurs with probability α.
βr The honest network mines a regular block on top of the
best block known to the public. In most cases, this is the
longest public chain. If there are competing chains, one
is chosen randomly (random tie breaking). The block is
always published immediately. This event is occurs with
probability 1− α− (δ · β).
βs The honest network mines a stale block competing with
the best block known to the public. If there is more than
one option, one is chosen randomly. This either creates
a new fork out of any chains at this height or extends a
fork formerly ending at this height. The block is always
published immediately. This event occurs with probability
δ · β.
If the selfish miner maintains a secret fork, there are the
following possibilities:
• The selfish miner mines another new block without the
honest network extending the public longest chain. He
therefore has a lead of two (or more) blocks. He will
keep extending his secret fork until the honest network
manages to catch up, i.e. the honest network builds a
chain with a length of one block less than the selfish
miner’s secret fork. Then the selfish miner broadcasts his
entire secret fork to have the honest network adopt his
fork as the main chain.
• The honest network catches up before the selfish miner
adds a second block to his secret fork. He then publishes
his secret block immediately to cause a race between
his block and the one of the honest network. Because
of random tie breaking, the honest network will split up
equally, partially mining upon on the selfish miner’s fork.
Deviating from random tie breaking, the selfish miner will
only mine upon his formerly secret block. If he mines the
next block, he will again publish it immediately to have
his blocks win the race. If the honest network mines the
next block, the selfish miner will adopt it regardless of
whether it was build upon his formerly secret block or
not.
The described behavior matches the original selfish mining
strategy [3] with the selfish miner’s influence on the honest
network γ being replaced by random tie breaking and the ad-
dition of honest network’s stale block generation ratio δ. Due
to these changes, the simulator is able to emulate a network
of altruistic miners in which stale blocks are created with a
certain ratio, e.g. due to network latency, even in absence of
a selfish miner. If a selfish miner is present, his actions may
of course further alter the honest network’s stale block ratio.
However, these changes lead to some consequences:
• Every time the honest network creates a stale block, it
fails to shorten the lead of the selfish miner’s secret fork
and intuitively seems to give him some advantage.
• The honest network might not always adopt a selfish
miner’s fork but extend either a shorter fork that was
previously outrun by one block or even fork the selfish
miner’s fork. This causes a race with uncertain outcome
for the selfish miner and intuitively seems to give him
some disadvantage.
• The selfish miner may choose to build the next secret
block on what will afterwards become a stale block.
Assuming he then loses a race to break a tie against the
honest network, his block can not be included as an uncle
block. He might however win the race or even increase
his lead to two (or more) and outrun the honest network
anyway.
As mentioned in Section II, the Ethereum blockchain allows
stale blocks to be referenced as uncles under certain condi-
tions. It forms a tree-like structure with each block having been
placed at its position with the intention of being or becoming
part of the main chain. Based on that, each particular block’s
possible uncles can only be first generation descendants of
any forks on the ascending path to the genesis block as seen
from this particular block. To maximize the expected reward,
more distant blocks are preferred – nearer blocks might still
be referenced from the current block’s descendants while more
distant blocks may then be out of range – to overall include
as many uncles as possible. The honest network is assumed
to always include any blocks as uncles while a selfish miner
might chose to include any blocks, own blocks or no blocks
at all. Since on the current Ethereum blockchain, the average
uncle block is included on average two blocks away (see
Section II), the honest network’s chance to actually include
an available uncle block was set to 0.33 per uncle block slot
and simulation step. In simulations without a selfish miner, this
resulted in the same average uncle block reward as observed in
the Ethereum network in November 2017 (see Section II). In
contrast, the selfish miner’s chance to include an uncle block is
always 1.0 – justified by the assumption of a perfect network
connection. If a selfish miner is present, his actions may of
course alter the average uncle block reward in the honest part
of the network further.
C. Simulation
The previously outlined Monte Carlo Simulator was im-
plemented to quantify the values of interest depending on
the selfish miner’s percentage of computational power. For
each parameter combination of α, selfish mining strategy, δ
and uncle block inclusion strategy, 100 random walks with at
least 217 generated blocks were run and analyzed to achieve
precise mean values. Utilizing more random walks with fewer
generated blocks per walk turned out to be less precise because
of border effects, e.g. the treatment of an unpublished fork
at the end of an simulation, have bigger impact and occur
more often. For parameters near the break even point, i.e.
0.15 ≤ α ≤ 0.30, each mean value was only accepted if the
underlying results’ standard deviation σ was smaller than a
threshold T1 of 0.001. This more precise threshold applied in
the range in which we expected the break even point. If σ was
greater than T1, the simulation was re-run with twice as many
generated blocks until the standard deviation was smaller than
T1. Using this value of T1, it is possible to derive from the
simulation results that the standard deviation of the α-value
of the break even point is 0.012. For any other values of α, a
higher threshold T2 of 0.01 was defined, accepting a possible
loss of accuracy.
To check plausibility, the results were verified against
known reference values. Since selfish mining has not been
analyzed in Ethereum yet, but is a well covered topic in
Bitcoin, the simulator was first adjusted to simulate Bitcoin
blockchains: the honest network’s stale block generation ratio
δ was set to zero, the selfish miner’s and the honest network’s
uncle block inclusion strategy were set to none. This ensured
that stale blocks would never be referenced as uncles and only
occur in presence of a selfish miner temporary forking the
honest network’s main chain. Consequently there would never
be more than two conflicting best blocks. Due to random tie
breaking, this causes the honest network to behave exactly as
the model of Eyal and Sirer [3] with the attacker’s network
influence γ set to 0.5. With this configuration, the simulator
was able to reproduce the corresponding results of Eyal and
Sirer [3].
While it was intended to compare the simulation results with
experimental results within a private testnet, the client of the
Ethereum Java reference implementation ethereumj [18] did
not reliably switch to the longest chain. These synchronization
issues affected solely the mining nodes if two or more mining
nodes were present and could not be solved during the work
for this paper. Thus, ethereumj couldn’t be used to verify
mining strategies. This bug seems to be low priority, as a single
miner node suffices to sustain a private network to experiment
with Ethereum except for the exploration of different mining
strategies. Mining in the main network is backed by OpenCL-
or CUDA-clients such as ethminer [19] utilizing graphics cards
due to their much higher computing power.
IV. RESULTS
The following Figures 2, 3 and 4 depict the results of a
Monte Carlo Simulation as defined in Section III-B, having
been run as described in Section III-C under the assumptions
of Section III-A.
First of all, a selfish miner benefits from the concept of uncle
block inclusion. His relative and absolute revenue increases at
higher honest network stale block rates δ and decreases if he
chooses to include the network’s stale blocks. This may be
explained as follows: A selfish miner creates a stale block
every time he looses a race to break a tie against the honest
network. With uncle block inclusion, these stale blocks may
be referenced afterwards, granting him a partial reward. As δ
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Fig. 2. Simulation results of a selfish miner’s RRR (relative revenue ratio) for different values of δ (honest network’s stale block ratio) on the left, simulation
results of RRR for a selfish miner that follows different uncle block inclusion strategies on the right.
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increases, the chance of the public chain growing faster than
the selfish miner’s secret fork decreases. This makes it easier
for a selfish miner to outrun the honest network. In case the
selfish miner is capable of creating a long fork, the honest
network is not capable of referencing the first block of their
outrun chain later since it is too far away. But the selfish miner
does not profit if he references that block since the average
uncle block inclusion reward awarded to him is much lower
than the reward for the honest network as the block’s miner.
Therefore the revenue gap between the selfish miner’s uncle
block inclusion strategies becomes noteworthy only at higher
rates of computational power. An overall positive effect of stale
blocks generated by the honest miners to the selfish miner’s
revenue ratio was also observed by Eyal and Sirer [3] and
following work.
Secondly, a selfish miner causes an increased stale block
ratio which decreases the average block reward. While the
trends of ARR in Fig. 3 are similar to those of RRR in Fig. 2,
the values of ARR are consistently lower. With blocks yielding
only partial reward in Ethereum, RRR is insufficient to
estimate the point at which selfish mining becomes profitable.
Measured with ARR, selfish mining in Ethereum becomes
profitable at α = 0.225 if δ = 0.12 and at α = 0.185 if
δ = 0.24 (see Fig. 3 on the right). For δ = 0.06 the break
even of profitability is at α = 0.245.
Lastly, the network’s resilience against further attacks is
significantly lowered. This is a consequence of the increased
stale block ratio: the higher the stale block ratio, the slower
the growth of the honest network’s main chain. If the selfish
miner aims to control the blockchain, he might need only the
computational power of α = 0.34 to overcome the honest
network if δ = 0.24 as depicted in Fig. 4 on the left. But even
if the selfish miner himself does not aim to control all blocks,
any other attacker would need less computational power to
overcome both the selfish miner and the honest network as
quantified by RNS in Fig. 4 on the right. Note that RNS will
increase noticeably again after the selfish miner overpowers
the honest network because he will create less stale blocks as
his chance to loose a race to break a tie diminishes.
V. CONSEQUENCES
As previously shown, a selfish miner benefits from the
concept of uncle blocks and can choose to include only own
uncle blocks or no uncle blocks at all to further enlarge the
honest networks stale block ratio, both improving his renevue
rate. Thus, it may look like a promising idea to weigh uncle
blocks during the selection of the best chain similar to the
GHOST-rule [6]. A selfish miner not including uncle blocks
would then loose their weight, too. A recent Ethereum Classic
Improvement Proposal (ECIP 1029 [20]) suggested to do so.
But because Ethereum uncle blocks need to be actively
referenced by some other block, a selfish miner maintaining
a secret fork might further profit from being able to also ref-
erence blocks previously not broadcast to the honest network.
When he releases his secret fork in which he referenced one or
more public blocks as uncle blocks, they one-sidedly increase
the selfish miner’s fork’s weight. This means, that even when
the selfish miner’s fork and the honest network’s chain have the
same length, the selfish miner’s fork is heavier. The following
Fig. 5 depicts two such situations. The honest network can not
reference the first block of the selfish miner’s fork until the
selfish miner releases it. If moreover the fork is longer than
6 blocks, the honest network can not reference its beginning
even after the publication. In such situations, all blocks on the
honest network’s chain which are not referenced as uncles by
the selfish miner become stale blocks. For the heaviest subtree
consensus rule to work as intended, Ethereum would have to
also change the referencing of uncle blocks to implement the
complete GHOST-rule [6], including its way of following the
chains from the root to determine uncle blocks. An analysis
of such a fundamental change on the design of Ethereum [21]
is beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. RELATED WORK
Attacks on the network- or the application-layer [22] of
Ethereum are not subject of this paper. It does not analyze
the so called uncle mining [9] as well. Uncle mining exploits
the difficulty calculation as before the Byzantinum hard fork
of Ethereum in October 2017 [8] by solely creating uncles on
purpose. This lowers difficulty on the long term and increases
block generation rate which may overcompensate the uncle
miner’s loss caused by every uncle yielding less mining reward
than regular blocks.
Instead, this paper focuses on the original selfish mining
strategy as developed by Eyal and Sirer [3]. Curtois and Ba-
hack [23] discussed this attack and criticized it as purely aca-
demic and impracticable. Nevertheless, Sapirshtein et al. [24]
explored the -optimal policies for when a selfish miner in
Bitcoin should release his secret fork, based on an extended
model of Eyal and Sirer [3] and an optimization algorithm. In
parallel, Nayak et al. [17] enhanced the attack by introducing
stubborn mining, in which the selfish miner also has more
options when to release his secret fork and combined these
with additional network layer attacks. Altogether, Sapirshtein
et al. [24] and Nayak et al. [17] significantly improved the
profitability of selfish mining.
This paper does not aim to optimize selfish mining in
Ethereum. Instead, it quantifies how the concept of uncles
generally influences the profitability of selfish mining. There-
fore only the basic selfish mining strategy was adopted but
combined with further Ethereum-specific variables such as the
network stale block ratio, causing network lag.
Previous work by Decker and Wattenhofer [4] pointed out
how block size affects propagation times and that network lag
is one reason for blockchain forks. An increased vulnerability
to 0.5 +  attacks was concluded, but not quantified. The
following work of Sompolinsky and Zohar [6] quantified a
security threshold against the 0.5 +  attack in relation to the
transaction throughput and developed the advanced consensus
rule GHOST to overcome this issue. The present paper tries
to quantify degradation of security against all possible attacks.
weigth of sample chains
with weighted uncles
weigth of sample chains
without weighted uncles
black = public chain
green = attacker's secret fork
2
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2
3
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2
2
4
4
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2
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Fig. 5. Two possible blockchain forks with and without weighted uncle blocks according to ECIP-1029 [20].
Gervais et al. [5] quantified the general trade-offs between
network throughput and blockchain security. Kiayias and
Panagiotakos [7] proved that blockchain security may be pre-
served at high transaction throughput by using GHOST. This
paper shows that the adaptation of GHOST as proposed for
Ethereum classic in [20] would actually weaken the blockchain
security and make Ethereum classic more vulnerable to selfish
attacks.
Luu et al. [25] perform a game theoretic analysis of
the security of Bitcoin mining pool protocols against block
withholding. It focuses on mining profitability but does not
quantify the effects on the blockchain’s security. The attack is
orthogonal to the selfish mining attack of the present paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
Compared to selfish mining in Bitcoin [3], the concept
of rewards for uncle blocks, as done in Ethereum, lowers
the amount of computational power at which selfish mining
becomes a viable strategy. While in Bitcoin the threshold for
γ = 0.5 is 0.25, the threshold in Ethereum may be as low
as 0.185 depending on the honest network’s stale block ratio.
Optimized strategies possibly lower this threshold even further.
Moreover, the overall network’s resilience against other attacks
– such as double spending – is significantly lowered during
selfish mining caused by a high stale block ratio. Any attacker
would then need less mining power to outrun the overall
network temporarily or even entirely. The adaption of optimal
selfish mining strategies as well as the in-depth-analysis of
countermeasures is left for future work.
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